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Abstract—Recent studies proved that deep learning approaches
achieve remarkable results on face detection task. On the other
hand, the advances gave rise to a new problem associated with
the security of the deep convolutional neural network models
unveiling potential risks of DCNNs based applications. Even
minor input changes in the digital domain can result in the
network being fooled. It was shown then that some deep learning-
based face detectors are prone to adversarial attacks not only
in a digital domain but also in the real world. In the paper,
we investigate the security of the well-known cascade CNN face
detection system - MTCNN and introduce an easily reproducible
and a robust way to attack it. We propose different face attributes
printed on an ordinary white and black printer and attached
either to the medical face mask or to the face directly. Our
approach is capable of breaking the MTCNN detector in a real-
world scenario.
Index Terms—adversarial attacks, face detection, MTCNN,
physical domain
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary deep learning systems are proved to be al-
most perfect face detectors, which outperform human abilities
in this area [1]. The number of applications in today’s life
increases tremendously due to this fact. They would replace
humans in areas where their accuracy is the most beneficial,
for example, security. So since their algorithm-driven decisions
may have serious consequences, the question of reliability and
robustness against malicious actions becomes crucial. One of
this task is face detection which is widely used as preparations
operation for FaceID, which allows tracing criminals or control
entrance policy.
There are several deep learning approaches to this problem,
end-to-end solutions like RetinaNet [1], and cascaded from
several NNs like MTCNN [2]. Although end-to-end approach
shows better results on synthetic benchmarks, cascaded sys-
tems with comparable quality are usually significantly faster.
Unfortunately, there is a technique called adversarial attack,
which allows deceiving almost any neural network-based
systems in some instances. For example, in the case of a
white-box attack in the digital domain, white-box since the
attacker has access to topology and weights on the network,
and digital domain because he changes input image pixel-wise.
There is no existing solution to mitigate this issue according to
recent publications [3] completely. Although these results are
interesting from theoretical point of view, in practice, the task
of face detection assumes that the processing image is obtained
from a real-world device like camera, which is protected from
the intrusion, i. e. attacker does not have direct access to the
input. It is called physical domain attack. Although there are
examples of this type of attacks, they proved to be much
harder to perform, since adversarial attacks tend to be very
fragile. Insignificant change in environment or illumination
usually destroys them. In order to address this issue, a special
technique called Expectation-over-Transformation (EoT) was
introduced in [4].
In this article, we present the attack on MTCNN face
detection system. There are no published attacks on this
face detector, although this system is quite well-known and
public. Probably, the reason is that this system is robust to
adversarial attacks due to its cascaded nature. Since it is
hard to use traditional methods (FGSM-like) on the whole
system, we decided to attack its first component. It is also
worth mentioning that the attacking method implies the use
of a public and well-known technique - adversarial attack; the
network is available on the Internet and considered to be open,
so the work does not violate any law or regulation.
The article is organised as follows. The attack itself is
described in section III, the experiments in section IV, and
in section II we review related works.
The source code and the video demonstration are available
on the Internet 1.
II. RELATED WORKS
Before describing the proposed method, we review some
of the widely used face detection models and their main
differences. Then we focus on the adversarial attacks and
1https://github.com/edosedgar/mtcnnattack
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
06
26
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
4 O
ct 
20
19
consider some of the essential works in the area. Since most of
the adversarial attacks are applicable in the digital domain and
do not pose potential security concerns in applications using
face detection models, we take a closer look at the real-world
adversarial attacks and how they can be generated.
A. Face detection models
The problem of face detection was first practically solved
in a seminal work of Viola and Jones [5]. The idea was
to apply a hand-crafted Haar feature to the input image
pyramid of different scales. Multi-scale pyramid of images
allows objects to be detected at different sizes and helps to
narrow down the number of proposed regions, thus boosting
up the classification. The algorithm is relatively fast, which
enables real-time detection but at the cost of poor results
with non-frontal faces and low light conditions. The following
works [6], [7], [8] mostly focused on improving the proposed
architecture.
Recent years have shown that CNN can potentially outper-
form all classic approaches based on standard features due
to its generalization ability. The approach that CNN utilized
[9] was quite similar to a classic one: the window with
learnt features was sliding over the pyramid of input images
and the resulted data fed to a fully-connected layer. Another
way of constructing a face detection system was proposed in
[10] where authors suggested using the inherent multi-scale,
pyramidal structure of DCNN to build feature pyramid.
Apart from the classification mentioned above, face detec-
tion networks can be categorized into two classes: single-shot
and multi-shot detectors. One of the most well-known exam-
ples of the single-shot detector is SSD network [11], which
takes an image as an input and computes a feature map with
bounding boxes for each class. A similar approach was utilized
in [12]. Multi-shot detector (usually two-stage) suggests using
several stages. The stages usually include proposal step and
refinement steps. One of the most well-known examples of
the two-stage detector is R-CNN [13]. The network extracts
region proposal with the selected search algorithm and then
warps cropped proposals to a square. Features are calculated
based on a sparse set of candidates, and the output is fed to a
classifier.
The networks with a pure cascade architecture held leading
positions for a long time in WIDER FACE challenge [14].
One of the most widely-used was MTCNN detector [2],
which performs both face detection and face landmarking.
The network uses three sub-networks: P-Net, R-Net and O-
Net. The first stage does the coarse face detection producing
proposal regions. Then Non-Maximum Suppression algorithm
reduces the number of overlapping boxed forming more certain
regions, which are fed to R-Net. R-Net refines the selected
proposals, and O-Net does the face landmarking. MTCNN is
still proposed to be used in the state-of-the-art face recognition
system described in [15]. Moreover, it is utilized in the most
popular public face recognition implementation of FaceNet
[16] available on GitHub 2.
2https://github.com/davidsandberg/facenet
Besides excellent performance, MTCNN is a promising
network in terms of robustness to adversarial attacks. The first
shallow P-Net has a receptive field size of 12x12, which makes
the detection resistant to the small artefacts on a face.
B. Adversarial attacks
Increased interest in neural networks helped to discover not
only its state-of-the-art performance in various applications
but also its serious drawback concerning robustness against
adversarial attacks [17]. Minor and invisible to human eye
changes in the input image can mislead the network and make
it misclassify the object depicted in the picture with high
confidence. It creates a severe security vulnerability in various
applications of DCNN.
Suppose a classifier mapping f : Rm → {1...k} is given.
The loss function is denoted by Lf : Rm×{1...k} → R+ and
is to be continuous. Provided x ∈ Rm is an image and l ∈
{1...k} is a label, the problem can be formulated as follows:
min
f(x+r)=l;
x+r∈[0,1]m
‖r‖ (1)
In [18] it was proposed to use a box-constrained L-BFGS
to find such r:
min
x+r∈[0,1]m
c‖r‖+ Lf (x+ r, l) (2)
As soon as the method for finding adversarial examples was
introduced, it was found in [19] that neural networks have a
linear nature. This fact enables attacks to be performed in
a more computationally efficient way with the use of Fast
Gradient Sign Method:
Xadv = X + sign(∇XJ(X, ytrue)) (3)
In some cases, one iteration of FGSM might not be suffi-
cient; therefore, FGSM was extended to an iterative version
in [20]:
XadvN+1 = ClipX,
{
XadvN + αsign(∇XJ(XadvN , ytrue))
}
(4)
In order to improve the optimization process further on
and make the adversarial attacks more robust, momentum was
added to iterative FGSM in the paper [21] and the method
is usually referred to MI-FGSM. It helps to memorize the
gradient direction over iterations, which a right solution to
pass through poor local minima or maxima.
It is commonly assumed, that network weights and model
topology are known for an attacker. That is called a white-
box attack. It may occur that the model information is not
available; thus FGSM cannot be applied; this is called a black-
box attack, which is well-explained in [22].
C. Attacks in physical domain
The adversarial attacks in the physical domain are assumed
to be more challenging. The input image fed to the network is
subjected to various transforms imposed by the real-world:
perspective transform, rotations, and so on. The searching
procedure should take into account it and generate such an
Fig. 1. The attack pipeline. The patches are applied to the batch of images. The resulted images are augmented and fed to three networks. Loss of the face
classification output and loss of the patches are computed, and the summed output is back-propagated to the patches.
input that is tolerant of this kind of transforms. Such toler-
ance is usually achieved with a technique called Expectation
over Transformation (EoT) [4]. The key point of EoT is to
model inherent perturbations in input during the optimization
procedure.
Adversarial attacks in the real-world domain might impose
more challenging problems as an attacker can mislead the
network in a non-intrusive fashion. For instance, with the
rise of autonomous vehicles, one can construct an attribute
for a stop sign and fool a self-driving car [23]. Authors did
another illustrative work in [24], where a particular pattern
was generated to avoid detection by a person detector based on
YOLO. The patch was trained with various transforms taken
into account to enable the real-world attack.
In the article, we focus on a grayscale real face attributes
to avoid face detection performed by MTCNN in real-time.
The attack is supposed to be a white-box.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we describe the whole process of generating
patches. Each sub-network of MTCNN has three output layers:
face classification, bounding box regression and face landmark
localization. Given this, we came up with three possible
approaches for the attack:
• Attacking the face classification layer of P-Net;
• Attacking the bounding boxes layer of P-Net, the similar
method for YOLO was described in [25], which exploits
a non-secure NMS algorithm;
• Attacking the output layer of O-Net;
• Attacking the whole network.
The first approach compared to the others, requires the least
demanding of architecture; hence, the face classification layer
P-Net will be used for the attack. Refer to Figure 1 for details
of the proposed attack pipeline. In the following subsections,
the detailed information on the attack pipeline will be given.
A. Expectation-over-Transformation
For adversarial attack it is important to be robust to succeed
in the physical domain. This task can be completed via
EoT technique which was mentioned before. In our case we
performed it in the following way: when an adversarial patch
is being trained it does not minimize loss function over a
single image, it uses batch consisted of multiple images with
different positions of the head instead. Since it minimizes loss
over pictures with different size of the patch and different
brightness, it should be robust against these types of transforms
in the real world. The scheme explaining the process is
depicted in Figure 2.
B. Projective transform
To apply rectangular patches on different surfaces, we use
a projective map. Projective map is defined by its eight
coefficients, which can be defined. Firstly in the real world,
we label patch location in edges of rectangles. If a patch has
curved boundaries, it can be approximated with a rectangular
grid. Then coefficients of projective transform are calculated,
and the patch is applied. The example of how it is performed
is depicted in Figure 3.
C. MTCNN analyzer
Once the patches are applied, and the resulted images are
augmented, they should be resized to various scales and fed
to P-Net. Originally, MTCNN builds up a pyramid of images
with a given scale step factor. Using all scales for attacks is
not feasible as it is more demanding of a resource. To mitigate
this problem, we develop two possible approaches:
• We find the scale contributing most to the detection and
use it with up-neighbouring scale and down-neighbouring
scale;
• We find the scale that contributes most to the detection
and use the scale with a slightly bigger size (which is not
Fig. 2. EoT process. The input images contain different head position and slightly different ambient luminance. The black dots on the mask depict placeholders
for the patches.
Fig. 3. Example of a projective map from patches to the face. The face is
labelled with printed grid, so for each rectangle coefficients of the transform
can be defined.
Fig. 4. The images fed to R-Net. The scales that give the most meaningful
pictures for R-Net are 4, 5 and 7. These layers will highly contribute to the
refinement stage.
presented in a pyramid originally) and slightly smaller
size, i.e. we do a size augmentation.
To find the most contributing scale, we let the image pass
through the P-Net and manually trace the scale that gives the
most meaningful results to R-Net. The example with pictures
size of 24x24 is shown in Figure 4. The more images with
face passed to R-Net the more likely the face detection ends up
successfully. Once three scales are selected in a way described
above, the pyramid is created and loss functions of outputs are
calculated.
D. Loss functions
The optimization process consisted of two main parts and
one optional:
• Face classification loss. The main objective is to lower the
probability so that face will not be detected. Two losses
were proposed to be used for Lclf : Linf and L2. Both
showed comparably good results. As we use three layers,
we sum the loss for each scale.
• Total variation loss. To make the optimization give pref-
erence for good-looking patterns without sharp color
transitions and noise, we calculate LTV from patches
given pi,j is a pixel value in position i, j:
LTV =
√
(pi.j − pi+1,j)2 + (pi.j − pi,j+1)2 (5)
Basically, the smoother transitions the less value of LTV .
• Black penalty loss. In the case of surgical mask it is
reasonable to reduce an amount of black color on the
patch, that enables patch to be less unusual. To decrease
the black colors, we use LBLK :
LBLK =
∑
i,j
1− pi,j (6)
Fig. 5. Experiment results. The probability is averaged over 1000 frames for
each scale step factor. With a generated patch, the misdetection probability
becomes significantly higher in both cases. The photos on the right are two
random frames from the recorded videos.
Finally, to balance the contribution of each optimization
coefficients are added and the total loss has the following form:
L =
∑
i=1...3
Lclfi + αLTV + βLBLK (7)
All coefficients were derived empirically and should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
To do experiments, we need to define the main parameters
for MTCNN. The minimal size parameter (minsize) determin-
ing the minimal size of an image in a pyramid was set to be
21 pixels (size of the shortest axis). The thresholds were set
to 0.6, 0.7 and 0.7 for each sub-network respectively, and the
scale step factor to 0.709. Such parameters are widely used in
practice.
The patches were trained for 2000 epochs; further training
did not give any improvement. To test a generated pattern,
we recorded videos with two setups: a surgical mask with
patches and just two patches on cheeks. The videos were used
to calculate a misdetection probability for various step scale
factors. To make the experiments more valuable in practical
sense, the position in videos was different: close-up, mid-range
and staying in a far distance. The results are given in Figure 5.
It is worth mentioning that the performed attack was targeted,
so not well-transferable to other persons not included to the
training samples.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article we:
• Found the method to attack the popular MTCNN face
detector in the digital domain;
• Transferred this attack to the physical domain with EoT
technique;
• Verified these results by conducting experiments in the
real-world domain.
The obtained results show that one the most robust face
detection network is still beyond expectations and need to
be improved. The attacks in physical domain impose severe
security issues, so possible ways to address it should be found.
In the article, we took the first step toward securing the face
detection systems by finding a reproducible attack. In the
future, we consider attacks using different places of intrusion
in MTCNN detection pipeline and think about possible im-
provement of security.
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